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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Meadow Valley") brief fails to 
dispute any of the statement of facts as contained in Transcontinental Insurance 
Company's (hereinafter "Transcontinental") brief. Furthermore, Meadow Valley fails to 
dispute that there are disputed issues of fact regarding the negligence of Meadow Valley 
or the proximate cause of the flooding. 
Rather, Meadow Valley seeks to impose an unduly broad interpretation on the 
term "arising out o f and argues that because BT Gallegos Construction Company 
(hereinafter "BT Gallegos") was working in the area, the flooding "arose out o f BT 
Gallegos' work. Clearly, Meadow Valley's argument is without merit. 
Because Meadow Valley has failed to dispute the statement of facts contained in 
Transcontinental's brief and because Meadow Valley has failed to dispute that there are 
disputed issues of fact, this Court may assume that the issues of material fact which 
preclude summary judgment contained on pages 8 and 9 of the brief of Transcontinental 
are indeed disputed issues of fact. Therefore, because this Court, like the trial court, must 
view "the facts and incidents in the light most favorable to the non-moving party", this 
Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case for 
l 
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i 
further proceedings to resolve the factual disputes. See Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). ( 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE 
FACTS OF THE CASE, WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO TRANSCONTINENTAL, SHOW THAT THE 
FLOODING DID NOT "ARISE OUT OF" BT GALLEGOS' WORK. 
Meadow Valley argues that this Court should interpret the insuring clause "arising 
out of your work" very broadly. In support of its argument, Meadow Valley claims that 
the Texas cases cited by Transcontinental, Granite Construction v. Bituminous Insurance 
Company, 832 SW.2d 472 (Texas App. 7th Div. 1992) and Northern Insurance Company 
of New York v. Austin Commercial Inc., 908 F Supp. 436 (ND Texas 1994), have been 
"distinguished and/or overruled". (See Brief of Appellee at page 15.) However, Meadow 
Valley's argument is without merit and belies a misunderstanding of Texas law and the 
posture in which these cases arose. 
In support of its position that Granite Construction Company and Austin 
Commercial have been overruled, Meadow Valley cites Admiral Insurance Company v. 
Trident NGL. 988 SW 2d 451 (Texas App. 1st Div. 1999) and McCarthy Brothers 
Company v. Continental Llovds. Inc.. 7 SW 3d 725 (Texas App. 3rd Div. 1999). The 
Court will note that the Granite Construction Company case comes from the Seventh 
District of Texas while the Admiral Insurance Company and McCarthy Brothers cases 
2 
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come from the First and Third Districts respectively. Under Texas law, the various " 
divisions of the Court of Appeals have independent jurisdiction and "the opinions of a 
sister Court of Appeals are not precedent that bind other courts of appeals." Mitchell v. 
Wiesner. Inc., 923 SW 2d 262, 264 (Texas App. 9th Dis. 1995). Citing Eubanks v. 
Mullin. 909 SW 2d 574 (Texas App. 1995); see also Shook v. State. 244 SW 2d 220 (Tex. 
Crim. 1951)(holding that opinions of sister appellant court do not set precedent that bind 
other courts of appeals). 
Therefore, to argue that the Granite Construction Company case has been 
"overruled" is without merit. At most, other Texas Courts of Appeals have disagreed 
with the Seventh District's decision in Granite Construction Company. 
In any event, this Court should decide the proper interpretation of the insurance 
policy here based upon the merits of the issue, not by taking a vote and determining what 
the majority position may be. 
The Granite Construction Company and Austin Commercial decisions are clearly 
the better reasoned decisions and their reasoning should be adopted by this Court. The 
insurance provision at issue here grants only limited coverage to Meadow Valley. Its 
plain and unambiguous terms give benefits to Meadow Valley as an additional insured 
"with respect to liability arising out o f "[BT Gallegos'] work". The policy defines "[BT 
Gallegos'] work" as "work or operations performed by [BT Gallegos] or on [BT 
3 
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Gallegos'] behalf and "materials, parts, or equipment furnishing connection with such 
work or operations". ( 
As established by the undisputed statement of facts contained in the opening brief 
of Transcontinental, the flooding in this case was caused by the failure of a ditch which 
was neither constructed nor maintained by BT Gallegos. This ditch which was 
constructed by another subcontractor Therefore, was not "[BT Gallegos5] work" within 
the meaning of the insurance policy. Construing the Transcontinental insurance policy 
according to its plain and unambiguous meaning, this Court should hold, as did the Austin 
Commercial and Granite Construction courts, that Transcontinental owes no duties to 
Meadow Valley to defend or indemnify Meadow Valley. See Nielsen v O'Rielly, 848 
P.2d 664 665 (Utah 1992)(holding that "the terms of insurance contracts... are to be 
interpreted according to their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, 
in an attempt to harmonize and give affect to all of the contact provisions"). 
Furthermore, should this Court adopt the reasoning of the Granite Construction 
and Austin Commercial cases, this Court would be upholding the purposes for which the 
parties entered into this insuring agreement in the first place. As the dissent in Admiral 
Insurance Company v. Trident NGL. Inc.. 988 SW 2d 451,457 (Texas App. 1st Dis. 
1999)(dissent) points out, 
As can be seen from this case and the other Texas case on point, the 
purpose of obtaining the coverage here is to protect the additional insured 
from acts of the named insured who has entered into a contract to provide a 
4 
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service to the additional insured.... The main company (Trident) wants 
protection from suits brought by persons injured by agents of the servicing 
company (KD Oilfield Service) who are on the premises to provide service 
to the main company. The main company requires the servicing company 
to obtain the coverage as a commission of receiving the servicing 
contract.... 
It is clear to me that the liability in this case arose from the operations of the 
main company. See and compare State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
v. Vaughan. 968 SW 2d 931, 932-34 (Texas 1998)(Supreme Court focused 
on the actual activity creating liability and determining application of 
exclusion for injuries "arising out of or in connection with" and insured's 
business). Here, the operations of the servicing company that placed its 
agent in harms way were not a cause of the harm. The servicing company 
had no liability for the contest or exposure in this case. 
To extend coverage to the acts of the main company that harm the agent of 
the servicing company upsets the delicate balance between the cost of this 
insurance policy and the coverage it provides. The result the majority gives 
the main company, the tortfeasor in this case, an alternative source of 
coverage for its own negligence, at the expense of the named insured, the 
servicing company. To uphold this result as an application of the rule 
requiring ambiguous policy provisions to be construed in favor of the 
insured is particularly inappropriate here because the servicing company 
paid for the policy. 
The plain and unambiguous terms of this contract indicates no intention of the 
parties that the insurance policy was purchased to protect Meadow Valley from Meadow 
Valley's own negligence. In fact, as pointed out by the Appellee in their brief at page 20, 
the subcontract agreement between BT Gallegos and Meadow Valley states that "the 
subcontractor's obligation under this provision should not extend any liability caused by 
the sole negligence of the indemnitee. " (R. 72.) 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
Therefore, if any intention of the parties can be divined from the record before this 
Court, it is that the parties intended for the insuring agreement between Transcontinental * 
and BT Gallegos would cover Meadow Valley only for accidents which arose out of BT 
Gallegos' negligence. There is no indication that the insuring agreement was ever 
intended to cover Meadow Valley for Meadow Valley's own negligence. 
POINT III 
INTERPRETING THE ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENT 
AS AFFORDING COVERAGE FOR MEADOW VALLEY'S OWN 
NEGLIGENCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW. 
Meadow Valley argues that Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1(2) is inapplicable to this 
case because it applies only to construction contracts. Meadow Valley misapprehends 
Transcontinental's arguments on this point. 
A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 is attached hereto as an addendum to this 
brief. Under Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1(2), "an indemnification provision in a 
construction contract is against public policy and is void and unenforceable." An 
indemnification provision is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-l(l)(b) as "a covenant, 
promise or agreement or understanding in, in connection with, or collateral to a 
construction contract requiring the promisor to insure, hold harmless, indemnify, or 
defend the promisee or others against liability." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, under § 
13-8-1(2) an insurance subcontract, like the contract between BT Gallegos and Meadow 
Valley cannot contain an indemnification provision. Furthermore, an indemnification 
6 
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provision is a provision which agrees to insure the other party for that party's negligence. 
Therefore, under § 13-8-1(2) BT Gallegos was statutorily prohibited from purchasing any 
sort of insurance policy which would insure Meadow Valley for Meadow Valley's own 
negligence. 
In the face of this clear statutory prohibition, Meadow Valley argues that the 
subcontract agreement between BT Gallegos and Meadow Valley required BT Gallegos 
to purchase an insurance policy which would insure Meadow Valley for Meadow 
Valley's negligence. Therefore, Meadow Valley argues, the insurance policy actually 
purchased by BT Gallegos in fact insures Meadow Valley for Meadow Valley's own 
negligence. 
However, since Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 prohibited the purchase of an insurance 
policy by BT Gallegos insuring Meadow Valley for Meadow Valley's own negligence, 
this Court should not interpret the insurance policy actually purchased by BT Gallegos as 
covering Meadow Valley for Meadow Valley's own negligence since such an 
interpretation would conflict with statutory prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 is a statement of both public policy and a guide to 
interpretation of agreements relating to a construction contract like the insurance policy 
issued by Transcontinental. In accordance with § 13-8-1, BT Gallegos purchased an 
insurance policy from Transcontinental which indemnified Meadow Valley for claims 
arising from work performed by BT Gallegos. Meadow Valley could not have required 
7 
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( 
BT Gallegos to provide an insurance policy for claims arising from Meadow Valley's 
own negligence without violating Utah law. 
Therefore, this Court should read the insurance policy issued by Transcontinental 
as being consistent with Utah law, i.e. indemnifying BT Gallegos for BT Gallegos' 
negligence and any damages which arose out of that negligence. However, because under 
§ 13-8-1 BT Gallegos could not purchase an insurance policy which indemnified Meadow 
Valley from Meadow Valley's own negligence, this Court should read the insurance 
policy as being consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. Since the flood damage was 
caused by the actions of a Meadow Valley employee, Transcontinental does not have a 
duty to indemnify Meadow Valley for this loss. 
The case cited by Meadow Valley in support of its argument is inapplicable. In 
Shell Oil Company v National Union Fire Insurance Company of PA. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
580 (Cal. App. 2d 1996), there is no indication that the statutory prohibition against 
indemnification agreements in construction contracts contained the same language as 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. The key language in the Utah Code provision is found in § 13-
8-l(l)(b). That subsection defines a prohibited "indemnification provision" to include 
provisions agreeing to "insure" another party to the contract for the other party's 
negligence. 
8 
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Therefore, because the California statutory prohibition against indemnification 
provisions did not include the language of § 13-8-l(l)(b), the Shell Oil decision cited by 
Meadow Valley is in applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and arguments stated above, and in Transcontinental 
Insurance Company's opening brief, Transcontinental Insurance Company respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this 
case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this j Q day of January, 2001. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
SCOjTyW. CHRISTENSEN 
JASON M. KERR 
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13-8-1 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to indem-
nify. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Construction contract" means a contract or agreement relative to 
the design, construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building, 
structure, highway, appurtenance, appliance, or other improvement to 
real property, including moving, demolition, or excavating, connected to 
the construction contract between: 
(i) a construction manager; 
(ii) a general contractor; 
(iii) a subcontractor; 
(iv) a sub-subcontractor; 
(v) a supplier; or 
(vi) any combination of persons listed in Subsections (l)(a)(i) 
through (v). 
(b) "Indemnification provision" means a covenant, promise, agreement 
or understanding in, in connection with, or collateral to a construction 
contract requiring the promisor to insure, hold harmless, indemnify, or 
defend the promisee or others against liability if: 
(i) the damages arise out of: 
(A) bodily injury to a person; 
(B) damage to property; or 
(C) economic loss; and 
(ii) the damages are caused by or resulting from the fault of the 
promisee, indemnitee, others, or their agents or employees. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), an indemnification provision in a 
construction contract is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. 
(3) When an indemnification provision is included in a contract related to a 
construction project between an owner and party listed in Subsection (l)(a), in 
any action for damages described in Subsection (l)(b)(i), the fault of the owner 
shall be apportioned among the parties listed in Subsection (l)(a) pro rata 
based on the proportional share of fault of each of the parties listed in 
Subsection (l)(a), if: 
(a) the damages are caused in part by the owner; and 
(b) the cause of the damages defined in Subsection (l)(b)(i) did not arise 
at the time and during the phase of the project when the owner was 
operating as a party defined in Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) This section may not be construed to affect or impair the obligations of 
contracts or agreements, that are in existence at the time this section or any 
amendment to this section becomes effective. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 35, § 1; 1997, ch. 113, (3) and designated the former second 
§ 1. undesignated paragraph as Subsection (4), sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- stituting "this section or any amendment to 
ment, effective May 5, 1997. rewrote the first this section" for "the act" and making stylistic 
paragraph of the section as Subsections (1) to changes. 
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